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unnecessary trade barriers on one hand and enhance demand via risk mitigation or quality 
assurance on the other. We stipulate a generalized gravity equation model to disentangle 
the effects of MRLs on the import demand and foreign exporters’ supply. Applying the 
framework to the MRLs on pesticides imposed by high-income OECD countries, we find 
that the MRLs jointly enhance the import demand and hinder foreign exporters’ supply. 
In addition, exporters from the less and least developed countries are more constrained by 
the MRLs than their competitors from the developed world. 
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1. Introduction 
The Agreements on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures and 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been 
effective since 1995. The two agreements are designed to reconcile the member countries’ 
right to apply SPS and TBT measures to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the 
protection of human health and the environment, while keeping the resulting trade 
distortion to a minimum. Over the past decade, the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO 
dealt with an increasing number of trade disputes citing either the SPS or the TBT 
agreement and claiming that certain regulations had created unnecessary trade barriers and 
constituted protectionism in disguise (World Trade Report, 2012). 
The implications of SPS measures and TBTs for international market access and 
welfare are more complex than those of traditional price-based trade barriers, such as tariffs 
and countervailing duties, because SPS and TBT regulations often address market 
imperfections. The corrective role of SPS measures and TBTs ranges from alleviating 
asymmetric information in the marketplace (e.g., labeling requirements) to mitigating risk 
in the consumption of certain products (e.g., restrictions on aflatoxin contaminants in edible 
nuts) and enhancing the sustainability of the eco-system (e.g., quarantine policies 
preventing exotic pests and diseases invasion). Therefore, SPS measures and TBTs are 
likely to affect both consumers and producers’ incentive structures and alter their behavior 
accordingly. 
From the perspective of producers and processors, the cost of complying with the 
SPS or TBT regulations can be high. The fixed costs may include the upgrade of practice 
codes and facilities, the acquisition of certificates, conformity in marketing requirements, 
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etc. In addition, inspection and testing procedures at custom points may cause prolonged 
delivery time, rejection of certain shipments, or even denial of entry completely.1 
Therefore, the proliferation of SPS measures and TBTs can significantly reduce a country’s 
imports from its trading partners, and even drive some foreign suppliers out of the market. 
This is the trade-cost effect, which corresponds to the “standards as barriers” argument in 
the international development literature (e.g., Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh, 2001; Anders 
and Caswell, 2009).2 
On the other hand, SPS measures and TBTs may enhance a country’s demand for 
imports if the regulations address market imperfections (Thilmany and Barrett, 1997). For 
example, mandatory labeling requirements in meat products can boost meat demand by 
conveying quality information to consumers (Bureau, Marette, and Schiavina, 1998). 
Alternatively, SPS policies can promote social well-being, in the form of better public 
health, higher animal welfare, or more sustainable environment.3 In economies where the 
consumer awareness of food safety, animal welfare, and plant health is high, the SPS 
measures could stimulate more demand for products under regulation (Josling, Roberts, and 
Orden, 2004). This is the demand-enhancing effect of SPS measures and TBTs, 
corresponding to the “standards as catalyst” argument in the literature. 
Therefore, SPS measures and TBTs either facilitate or hinder international trade, 
depending on whether the demand-enhancing effect, if any, outweighs or falls short of the 
trade-cost effect. This dual effect calls for a different analytical framework from those used 
                                                 
1 See for example the U.S. monitoring programs for food imports at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/importrefusals/ 
2 Note that the trade-cost effect is net of any efficiency gains from better production or distribution practice 
induced by the SPS/TBTs. See Jaffee and Henson (2005) for more details. 
3 See Peterson and Orden (2008) for an example of U.S. import ban on Mexican avocadoes (1915-1997) 
due to the concern of invasive exotic species. 
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to analyze conventional trade taxes.4 The conventional wisdom that trade liberalization 
improves market access and welfare does not necessarily carry over to SPS measures and 
TBTs. For example, in a case study of antibiotic residues in crustaceans, Disdier and 
Marette (2010) show that tighter standards on antibiotic residues improve social welfare 
at the expense of contracted international trade. 
In this article we provide a novel methodology to disentangle the dual effects of 
Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs), as a particular SPS measure, on the imports of plant 
products in high-income OECD countries. Exposures to pesticide and antibiotic residues 
through diet can be harmful to humans and especially children (Eskenazi, Bradman, and 
Castorina, 1999). Survey-based studies suggest that consumers value food safety such as 
the reductions in risk associated with pesticide residues (Eom, 1994). Consumers’ 
valuation of risk mitigation provides incentives for importers and retailers to ensure 
acceptable level of food safety, for either legal or reputation causes (Henson and Caswell, 
1999). Most governments mitigate food borne hazards by either banning the most toxic 
substances, or by limiting the degree of contamination in agricultural and food products. 
Regulatory agencies can determine their own MRLs or rely on international 
standards such as MRLs set by Codex Alimentarius, a joint body of the UN World Health 
Organization and Food Agriculture Organization. Codex MRLs are science-based and 
considered least trade-distorting. In the United States, for example, these MRLs are 
regulated principally by the US Environmental Protection Agency with enforcement 
functions by the US Food and Drug Administration, US Department of Agriculture, and 
state enforcement agencies (USEPA, 2013). The EU, Australia, and Japan tend to have 
                                                 
4 For example, Beghin, Disdier, and Marette (2012) apply the ad valorem equivalence approach to non-
tariff measures in agriculture and find that some non-tariff measures translate into negative trade taxes. 
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MRLs much more stringent than the Codex MRLs whereas many other countries have 
their standards near or explicitly follow the Codex recommendations.  A few developing 
countries such as Sri Lanka use lenient MRLs (Li and Beghin, 2012b). 
Our proposed methodology identifies the demand-enhancing effect and the trade-
cost effect of MRL stringency separately based on one simple but essential fact: the same 
MRLs affect different trading partners differently. For an exporting country that already 
implements similarly stringent regulations at home, its exports to the market with a new 
MRL policy would be little interrupted, because its producers and handlers have learned to 
meet related regulations and are capable of meeting the MRL abroad at low cost. In 
contrast, for a source country with no MRLs, its export prospects to a foreign market would 
be severely impeded by MRLs in the destination market, because of the high compliance 
costs for meeting the new regime.5 Empirically, the differential impacts of MRLs on 
different exporters enable us to disentangle the two effects.  
By investigating MRLs adopted by high-income OECD countries and their imports 
of plant products from major trading partners, we show that the MRLs jointly enhance the 
import demand for plant products and impede foreign supplier’ access to the markets of 
high-income OECD countries. Moreover, we find evidence that exporters of plant products 
from less or least developed countries are more constrained by MRL stringency than their 
competitors from the developed world. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a conceptual 
model leading to an econometric model in which the dual effects of MRLs are 
                                                 
5 The differential impacts of SPS and TBTs on different exporters are well documented in the literature. For 
example, Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni (2008) show that SPS and TBTs in agriculture significantly 
reduce the OECD’ imports from developing countries, but do not affect trade flows among the OECD 
members. 
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disentangled. In section 3, we describe the data and present the empirical results. In the last 
section, we draw conclusions and discuss possible extensions. 
2. The modeling approach 
Our analytical framework characterizes the separate impacts of MRLs on the import 
demand for and the trading partners’ supply of plant products. In equilibrium a 
generalized gravity equation model emerges, which lays the foundation for an empirical 
specification to be estimated in the next section. 
2.1. The import demand 
There is a representative consumer in country j  with preferences characterized by 
the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility. All plant products are assumed 
differentiated by sectors and by country of origins (Armington, 1969). For example, 
“Japanese apples” and “U.S. apples” are distinct goods in the composite sector “apples.” 
As discussed in the previous section, MRL polices mitigate food borne risk and affect the 
import demand for the plant products under regulation.6  
Specifically, the representative consumer in country j  maximizes its consumption 
utility subject to her budget constraint: 
(1a)    
1
1max [ ( ) ]
d
sij
d
j sj sij
Q s i
U Q

      
(1b)    . . dsij sij j
s i
s t P Q Y ,  
where sj  is the representative consumer’s perceived quality of good s ; dsijQ  is the 
consumer’s quantity demanded for good s  produced by country i ;  is the constant 
                                                 
6 The MRLs may also generate non-market values that are external to the consumer, such as risk mitigation 
in public health or environmental sustainability in the long run. We abstract from this positive externality 
because it is not reflected in the marketplace and the associated social values are difficult to measure. 
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elasticity of substitution; sijP  is the price of good s  produced in country i  and sold in 
country j ; jY  is the national income of country j. The solution to the problem (1a)-(1b) 
leads to country j’s import demand (in values) for good s originated from country i: 
(2)       
1 1
sj sijd d
sij sij sij j
j
P
V P Q Y
       ,                                                                                                           
where 1 1j sj sijs i P
      is the consumer price index in country j . Note that, for 1 , 
the above import demand is positively related to the importing country’s income and the 
consumers’ quality perception, but negatively related to the price of the good. 
The information disclosed by the MRLs, among other factors, alters the 
consumer’ preferences for the product. In particular, we parameterize sj  as  
(3)        0 exp( ),sj s sjMRL                                                                           
where 0s  is the consumer’s quality perception for good s  in absence of MRL regulation; 
sjMRL  is the stringency index of MRLs for sector s  in country j , with larger index 
representing more stringent MRLs (i.e., lower tolerance levels) ;7   is a parameter to be 
estimated that captures the degree to which the MRLs affect the import demand. 
Intuitively, (3) characterizes the demand-enhancing effect, or the quality improvement 
effect, associated with the MRLs. As an implicit assumption in our characterization of the 
import demand, the MRLs apply to imports of all origins, which is consistent with the non-
discrimination principle of the WTO. 
2.2. The foreign exporters’ supply 
There is a representative producer for each sector in each country. The goods sold 
                                                 
7 See the next section for the definition of the stringency index.  
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by this producer in different destinations are imperfect substitutes because she tailors the 
specifications of her products to the marketing requirements in each market. For example, 
U.S. apples targeting the Japanese market are grown and handled differently to conform 
to the SPS regulations in Japan (Calvin, Krissoff, and Foster, 2008). The representative 
producer for sector s  in country i  is endowed with a production capacity siQ  and a 
Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) technology (Geraci and Prewo, 1982; 
Bergstrand, 1985).8 The CET technology allows the producer to transform products for 
different destinations. The problem for the representative producer is to decide which 
markets to target and how much to sell in each destination. Denoting si  as the set of 
countries the representative producer for sector s  in country i  decides to serve,9 we 
characterize the producer’s problem as  
(4a)      
{ }
max
s
sij j si si
s
sij sij
Q j
P Q
 
                                                                                                
(4b)      
1
1. . [ ( ) ] ,
si
s
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

                                                                           
where ssijQ  is country i’s quantity of good s supplied to country j; 0  is the elasticity of 
transformation, with a large  in absolute value meaning easier transformation; sij >1 is 
the “iceberg melting” trade cost term: sij  units of good s  have to be shipped out of 
country i  in order for one unit to arrive in country j . The solution to (4a)-(4b) results in 
country i’s supply of good s to country j, in values, as: 
                                                 
8 The production capacity is fixed in the short run and exogenous to MRLs. We leave out the long-run 
effect of MRLs on the production capacity because our data set exhibit limited time variation. 
9 For tractability, we do not explicitly model the endogenous choice of si . However, we account for 
countries’ self-selection to export by using the Heckman sample selection model in the empirical section. 
Interested readers are referred to Chaney (2008) for a theoretical characterization of firms’ decisions to trade 
and Kim, Reimer, and Gopinath (2011) for an empirical application to Korean manufacturing firms. 
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where 111 ][ 
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sij sijsijsi
P  is the producer price index for sector s  in country i , 
reflecting the cost of exporting to all possible destinations.  Note in (5) that the foreign 
exporter’s supply is positively related to the production capacity of the exporting country 
and the price of the good, but negatively related to the cost of trading between countries. 
The bilateral trade cost arises from various factors such as import tariffs, 
geographical distance between the two countries, cultural similarity, and the difference in 
MRL regulation in particular. As a convention in the gravity model, we parameterize the 
trade cost, sij , as 
(6)       
(1 )(1 ) exp( )exp( )exp( )
exp( )exp( max{ ,0}),
db
sij sij ij p ij b ij c ij
r ij sj si
Tar Dist b Lang b Bord b Col
b Rel MRL MRL


     
                                           
where sijTar is country j’s tariff rate imposed on good s from country i;  ijDist  is the 
distance between country i  and j ; ijLang  is the common language dummy variable that 
equals one if the two countries use the same official language; ijBord  is the common 
border dummy variable that equals one if the two countries are adjacent; ijCol  is the 
colonial dummy variable that equals one if the two countries had a colonial relationship 
in history; ijRel  is the proportion of two populations that speak a common language;  , 
db , bb , cb , rb , all presumably positive, are parameters to be estimated. 
The new source of trade cost in (6) is the difference in MRLs between trading 
partners. Intuitively, our characterization of the trade cost of MRLs highlights the 
differential impacts of MRLs on different exporting countries. Exporters from countries 
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with lax or no MRL regulation ( sj siMRL MRL ) have to overcome additional costs to 
reach the stringent limits required by the importing country. However, exporters who 
have been subject to tougher MRLs in their domestic markets ( sj siMRL MRL ) are less 
likely to experience trade disruption from MRLs variation in the importing country, 
because of their capabilities to comply with the regulation at negligible or low cost.10 As 
a by-product, our characterization of the trade cost of MRLs naturally accommodates the 
harmonization of standards between countries. For example, MRLs do not cause 
additional cost of trade if both trading partners adopt international or regional standards. 
2.3. The equilibrium 
In equilibrium, consumers’ import demand equals foreign exporters’ supply in 
each sector and for any pair of countries. By imposing the market clearing condition 
s
sij
d
sij VV  , we solve for the equilibrium trade value, sijV , and the equilibrium price, sijP , in 
sector s  and for exporting country i  and importing country j . Specifically, (2) and (5) 
lead to  
(7a)      
1 1 1 1
( ) ( ) ,j sisij sj sij
j si
Y
P
Q
 
        
 
          and                                                                      
(7b)      
1 1 ( 1)(1 )
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Y QV
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
   
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Equation (7a) suggests that the equilibrium price is increasing in the importing country’s 
income level, jY , the perceived quality of the imports, sj , and the trade cost between the 
two countries, sij ; but it is decreasing in the exporting country’s total supply, siQ . 
                                                 
10 Our characterization of the trade cost of MRLs is similar to the heterogeneity index used by Winchester 
et al. (2012) and Liu and Yue (2013). 
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Equation (7b) shows that the bilateral trade value is increasing in the importing country’s 
income level, jY , the exporting country’s capacity, siQ , and the quality of the imports, sj ; 
but it is decreasing in the trade cost between the two countries, sij .  Substituting (3) and 
(6) into (7b) and taking the logarithmic transformation, we arrive at the following 
characterization of bilateral trade values in equilibrium:   
(8)  
ln( ) (1 ) (1 ) ln(1 ) ln(1 )
max{ ,0} ,
sij j j si si sij l ij d ij
b ij c ij r ij sj si sj
V Y Q Tar b Lang b Dist
b Bord b Col b Rel MRL MRL MRL
      
    
            
       
where (1 ) ( )       and ( 1)(1 ) ( )        . 
Equation (8) forms a generalized gravity equation model in which the demand-
enhancing effect and the trade-cost effect of MRLs are identified separately.11 When an 
importing country increases its stringency (variable sjMRL  becomes larger), both effects 
are at work. On one hand, the more stringent regulation boosts the import demand because 
of the informational gain or the quality improvements associated with the new regulation. 
On the other hand, the tightening of the MRLs imposes additional costs upon the foreign 
supplies. This extra hurdle can be either significant or trivial, depending on whether the 
foreign supplies have been subject to similar regulations in their home markets. The 
differential impacts of MRLs on exporters of different origins allow us to disentangle the 
two effects in empirical applications. 
By disentangling the dual effects of MRLs on international trade, our conceptual 
model leads to more plausible policy implications based on fundamental factors in the 
                                                 
11 See Evenett and Keller (2002) or Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose (2003) for the linkage of the gravity 
model to various trade theories. See Novy (2013) for a recent study of global trade costs using a variant of 
the gravity model.  
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world market for agricultural products. In particular, our model explicitly captures how 
both sides of the market react to MRLs, which enables us to better interpret the evidence 
accumulated in the literature. For example, Xiong and Beghin (2012) find that EU’ 
harmonization and tightening of aflatoxin residue standards in 2002 has not significantly 
reduced Africa’s groundnut exports to Europe. The negligible net effect of the MRL is 
consistent with either an inconsequential regulation, or the two significant effects on EU 
groundnut demand and Africa’s groundnut supply cancelling out. Policy implications are 
drastically different between the two cases. While the former scenario requires no action, 
the latter case suggests that technical assistance to groundnut producers and processors in 
Africa would help them reap the high premium of safer groundnuts. Our disentangling 
approach can be used to discern the two cases and offer relevant policy recommendations. 
3. The empirical application 
We apply the above model to examine the impacts of MRLs adopted by high-income 
OECD countries on their imports of plant products. The literature provides mixed 
evidence regarding the conventional wisdom that the MRLs distort international trade in 
agricultural commodities. The estimated impact of MRLs on trade is sensitive to the 
products of concern, the country groups of interest, and to some extent the estimation 
methods, spanning from significantly trade-impeding to significantly trade-facilitating (Li 
and Beghin, 2012a). Related to our investigation, Winchester et al. (2012) find weak 
evidence that the difference in MRLs on pesticides and veterinary drugs between EU and 
its trading partners hinders EU’s imports of plant and animal products, but without 
accounting for possible demand enhancement effects. By disentangling the dual effects of 
MRLs, we improve upon the existing literature and offer a cogent rationalization of these 
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various outcomes. 
3.1. The empirical strategy 
The conceptual model, characterized by (8), provides a basis for the empirical 
specification. One caveat in the execution is to appropriately account for the effects of two 
unobservable factors, j  and si . As suggested by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), 
the two price indices can be interpreted as the multi-lateral trade resistance terms in the 
importing and the exporting country respectively. Feenstra (2003) further shows that 
importers’ and exporters’ fixed effects can fully control for the effects of these price 
indices in cross-sectional analyses. A panel analysis would require the inclusion of year-
specific importers’ fixed effects and year-and-sector specific exporters’ fixed effects in 
the specification. To reduce the dimension of the econometric specification, we use year-
specific importers’ fixed effects and year-and-chapter specific exporters’ fixed effects.12 
Note that the income effects in the importing countries are entirely absorbed by the year-
specific importers’ fixed effects. 
To accommodate zero trade flows, we use the Heckman sample selection model 
(Heckman, 1979). The Heckman model has two major advantages. First, it explains the 
absence of trade by exporters’ self-selection, which is consistent with the new trade 
theory featuring heterogeneous firms and fixed costs.13 Second, the Heckman model 
allows exploring the impacts of MRLs through affecting both the volume of trade, or the 
intensive margin, and the propensity to trade, or the extensive margin. From the 
                                                 
12 Specifically, our data set covers 4 years, 60 exporting countries, and 109 plant products falling into 6 HS 
chapters. Replacing year-and-sector specific exporters’ fixed effects with year-and-chapter specific 
exporters’ fixed effects reduces the dimension from 21160(=4*60*109) to 1440(=4*60*6). 
13 Another estimator capable of capturing zero trade flows is the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood 
(PPML) estimator (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). However, Martin and Pham (2008) show that PPML 
leads to biased estimates when zero trade is a censored outcome. The update by Santos Silva and Tenreyro 
(2011) does not address the issue of censoring either. 
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perspective of international development, the effect along the extensive margin bears 
important policy implications because small traders are likely to be deprived of 
international market access, because of the food safety policies. 
Consistent with (8), our empirical specification is as follows: 
(9a)  
ln( ) (1 ) ln(1 ) ln(1 )
max{ ,0} ,
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, 
where sijtT  is the ideal amount of trade in the absence of countries’ self-selection to the 
world market, *sijtD  is a latent variable capturing the binary decision to trade or no trade, 
and sijtV  is the actually observed trade flow. Variable jtfe is the fixed effect for the 
importing country j in year t, hitfe  is the fixed effect for HS chapter h in the exporting 
country i in year t. Equation (9a) explains the size of bilateral trade while (9b) 
characterizes the likelihood that the two countries trade with each other. The two error 
terms in (9a) and (9b) may be correlated due to omitted trade determinants that affect 
both the size and the propensity of trade. 
We estimate (9a)-(9c) jointly using the two-step procedure.14 The identification of 
the model requires an excluded variable that potentially affects the fixed cost of trade but 
                                                 
14 Alternatively, one can estimate the system by the maximum likelihood approach. However, the 
computational complexity causes convergence problems in our application. 
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not the variable cost of trade. Following Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), we 
choose the common religion variable as the exclude variable.15 Furthermore, to allow 
possible heterogeneity across agricultural sectors in the self-selection process, we use the 
interaction terms of the chapters’ fixed effects with the common religion variable.16  
Finally, we address the possible endogeneity of MRLs. Lobbying efforts of 
domestic industries can influence public policies, such as MRLs. However, it is unclear 
from the existing studies whether food safety policies are more driven by the protectionist 
motives or legitimate social objectives.17 In our application, the potential bias due to the 
endogeneity problem is limited because the fixed effects capture the difference in policy 
designs across countries and sectors to a large degree. 
3.2. The data 
MRLs are frequently updated by regulatory agencies across countries. We use two 
data sources for the MRL information: the global MRL database developed by the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Homologa database available from the 
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in the United Kingdom. The USDA 
database consolidates the currently effective MRLs on pesticides applied to plant 
products and veterinary drugs applied to animal products (USDA-FAS). These MRLs are 
listed by pesticide or drug type, by commodity, and by country (inclusive of Codex). The 
Homologa database contains historical MRLs but the country coverage was highly 
restricted to the developed world prior to 2008. We take two cross-sections of the global 
MRL regulations: 2008 from Homologa and 2012 from USDA-FAS. 
                                                 
15 Our choice is also justified by the pragmatic reason that the common religion variable is statistically 
insignificant in the simple OLS regression based on (9a). 
16 We thank the editor for this suggestion. 
17 See the World Trade Report (2012) for a summary of case studies of the political economy of SPS 
measures and TBTs. 
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To measure the restrictiveness of the MRL regulation toward a given product in a 
given country, we follow Li and Beghin (2012b) and define the following stringency 
index of MRLs: 
(10)
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,
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1= exp( ),
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k k
k k
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MRL MRL
MRL
N MRL

 
where 
( )kjkn
MRL is the MRL adopted  by country j , for product k , and targeting pesticide 
( )kn ;  ( ), kcodex knMRL  is the MRL recommended by Codex for the same product and 
pesticide combination; and ( )kN  is the total number of pesticides applicable to product 
k .18 According to (10), the tougher a country’s MRL regulation towards a product, the 
larger the index is for that combination of country and product. In addition, the stringency 
index reduces to one if a country defers to the Codex completely. An index above one 
would indicate that, averaging over various pesticide types, the MRL regulation is more 
restrictive than Codex for the product of interest and the country under consideration.19 
Next we turn to the product and country coverage. Following Li and Beghin 
(2012b), we identify 109 plant products of which the commodity descriptions can be 
mapped with either the 4-digit or 6-digit product codes in the Harmonized System.20 We 
focus on bilateral trade flows from 61 exporting countries to 20 importing countries.21 
The selection of the exporting countries is based on the MRL data availability. The 
importing countries under consideration are 20 high-income OECD economies, where 
consumer awareness and valuation of food safety is arguably high and carries weight in 
                                                 
18 Missing MRLs for some pesticides are replaced by the default tolerance levels in each country. 
19 See Li and Beghin (2012b) for more discussions of the properties of the stringency index. 
20 See Table A in Appendix A for the list of plant products. 
21 See Table B in Appendix B for the list of importing and exporting countries.  
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public policies and retailer behavior. Consequently, the adopted MRLs are likely to affect 
the food demand and these countries are good candidates for our purpose. 
To allow enough variations over time, we retrieve bilateral trade series from UN-
COMTRADE for the year 2007, 2008, 2011, and 2012. We match the 2008’s MRLs with 
trade flows in 2007 and 2008, and the 2012’s MRLs with trade data in 2011 and 2012. 
The underlying assumption is that the MRL stringency does not vary significantly within 
two consecutive years (or even over the course of four years, as shown in Table 1 below). 
To proxy the production capacity in each sector in each country, or sitQ , we sum the 
country’s exports of the product to all destinations.22 We drop observations for which the 
potential exporting countries do not export to the rest of the world at all.  
We also include other sources of bilateral trade costs. We use the tariff data from 
the Macmap database of the UNCTAD/WTO International Trade Centre.23 The tariff 
rates are ad valorem rates computed from national tariff lines as of 2010.24 Note that we 
choose the tariff year different from the trade years of interest to avoid the endogeneity 
issue in computing the tariff rates. As standard practice in gravity analysis, we also 
include cultural variables such as the colonial tie dummy variable, the common official 
language dummy variable, the common border dummy variable, and the distance variable 
are sourced from the CEPII database.25 In addition, we use the common religion variable 
from Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) as the excluded variable in our 
specification. In addition, we drop the trade flows within EU because the intra-EU trade 
is considered systematically freer than usual cross-border trade. 
                                                 
22 Strictly speaking, our measurement of production should be interpreted as exportable production, 
because domestic consumption is not accounted for. 
23 The database documentation and access are available at http://www.macmap.org/ 
24 The 2010 tariff information is unavailable for Korea, for which the 2007 rates are used. 
25 http://www.cepii.com/anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.asp 
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We present the summary statistics for the MRL stringency indices in Table 1. 
Averaging across 109 plant products and the 20 importing countries, the MRL stringency 
index is 1.34 in 2012 and 1.38 in 2008, which implies that pesticide control measures in 
the high-income OECD community are systematically tougher than the Codex standards. 
Although the MRL stringency is fairly constant over time, there is a trend among OECD 
countries, EU in particular, to loosen their MRLs and harmonize with the Codex 
recommendations. The MRL stringency index for an average country outside of the high-
income OECD community is close to unity, indicating that the associated MRLs 
generally gravitate around the Codex levels.  
The comparison of the stringency indices between trading partners reveals that 
more than 60 percent of bilateral trade records in the sample correspond to flows of plant 
products from countries with relatively lax MRL regulation to countries with relatively 
tougher standards. Trade flows in the reverse direction constitute slightly less than 30 
percent of our sample. In addition, less than 10 percent of the trade flows occur between 
countries with equally stringent MRLs. 
Table 1. Summary statistics for the MRL stringency indices 
 2012  2008 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
High-income OECD’ stringency index 1.34 0.49  1.38 0.47 
Other countries’ stringency index 1.01 0.18  1.02 0.24 
      
Comparison of MRL stringency 
 Frequency  Frequency  
MRL is tougher in the importing country 64%  68%  
MRL is tougher in the exporting country 29%  27%  
Equal stringency between trading partners 7%  5%  
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3.3.      Results and discussions 
Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients in the system (9a)-(9c). Both estimated 
effects of MRLs are statistically significant and bear the expected signs in the outcome 
equation. The evidence of the demand enhancement associated with MRLs lends support 
to the hypothesis that pesticide control measures alleviate information asymmetry by 
assuring the food safety of the products under regulation. Therefore, MRL regulation in 
plant products achieves legitimate public objectives and does not necessarily translate 
into protectionism. In the selection equation, we find that countries with tougher MRLs 
are more likely to import from other countries, and that the difference in MRL 
regulations has negligible implications for bilateral trade partnership.  
Table 2. Estimated coefficients for high-income OECD’s imports of plant products 
 Variable 
{parameter} 
Outcome 
Equation 
Selection 
Equation 
 Variable 
{parameter} 
Outcome 
Equation 
Selection 
Equation 
Demand shifter 
{ } 
 0.707*** 
(0.052) 
 0.152*** 
(0.014) 
 ln(Dist.) 
{ db } 
-2.267*** 
(0.051) 
-0.615*** 
(0.008) 
Trade-cost shifter 
{  } 
-0.250*** 
(0.059) 
 0.013 
(0.016) 
 
 
Border 
{ bb } 
 0.529*** 
(0.110) 
-0.240*** 
(0.033) 
ln(Prod) 
{1  } 
 1.209*** 
(0.016) 
 0.228*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
Colony 
{ cb } 
 0.589*** 
(0.057) 
 0.121*** 
(0.016) 
ln(Tariff) 
{  } 
-1.535*** 
(0.112) 
-0.456*** 
(0.030) 
 
 
Language 
{ lb } 
 1.009*** 
(0.049) 
 0.309*** 
(0.012) 
Inverse Mills 
Ratio 
 3.629*** 
(0.100) 
 --   
# of Obs. 
 
58,603 
 
315,397 
Note: The year-specific importing countries’ fixed effects and the year-specific and chapter-specific 
exporting countries’ fixed effects are included in the regressions but omitted from the table for brevity. 
Chapter-specific common religion variables are used as the excluded variables. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. Notations *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively.  
 
With regard to other sources of trade cost, import duties and distance are found to 
hinder trade in plant products, with both elasticities well above one. A common border 
increases the size of trade as commonly found in the literature, but the negative border 
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effect on the decision to trade is unexpected. A closer look at the data reveals that the 
counter-intuitive result is driven by the fact that Israel trades much less frequently with its 
neighboring countries. Colonial relationships in history help create trade partnerships and 
enlarge the scale of trade. Countries with the same official language are more likely to 
trade than otherwise. Further, we find that countries with larger production capacities 
export more. In addition, the Inverse Mill’s ratio is highly significant, which confirms 
that countries are self-selected to trade and justifies the use of the Heckman procedure. 
To further explore the dual effects of MRLs on the intensive and extensive margins 
of trade, we compute the marginal effects of MRLs along both margins. This pursuit 
enables us to investigate whether MRLs influence international trade primarily through 
altering the size of trade or affecting the partnership between countries. Specifically, we 
define the marginal effects along the intensive margin as the impacts on the volume of 
trade in terms of elasticities. In the Heckman model, these marginal effects are identical to 
the raw estimates in the outcome equation. We define the marginal effects along the 
extensive margin as the impacts on the percentage change in the probability of trade. In the 
Heckman model, these marginal effects deviate from the raw estimates in the selection 
equation by a factor of the fitted probabilities of trade. 
Table 3 presents the marginal effects of MRLs through both margins of trade. We 
find that tougher MRLs entice more demand primarily through the intensive margin, 
suggesting that the higher food safety would benefit established bilateral exchanges more 
than new ones. The costs associated with MRLs reduce the volumes high-income OECD 
import from supplying countries, but barely affect the likelihood of trade partnership. 
Furthermore, we test whether the net impact of importers’ MRLs is zero, given that both 
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shifters are at work. Statistically, the hypothesis amounts to the parameter constraint 
  =0. As shown in Table 3, the P-values for the Chi-square statistics lead us to 
reject the hypothesis that the overall impact of MRLs imposed by high-income OECD 
countries is negligible for their imports of plant products. Note that the net impact of 
MRLs is positive on high-income OECD members’ imports of plant products, which 
invalidates the conventional wisdom that stringent food safety will impede trade. To put 
the results into economic perspective, we find that the high-income OECD members’ 
imports of these products would decrease by nearly 12% if the member countries 
uniformly defer their MRLs to Codex recommendations. 
Table 3. Marginal effects of MRLs on high-income OECD’ import of plant products 
 Intensive margin Extensive margin 
Demand-enhancing effect  0.707*** 
(0.052) 
 0.315 
(0.295) 
Trade-cost effect -0.250*** 
(0.059) 
 0.028 
(0.043) 
H0: the net effect of importer’s MRLs is zero.  
P value for the test statistic 0.000  0.000 
Note: Marginal effects are computed as the averages of marginal effects for individual observations. 
Standard errors in parenthesis are derived from the Delta method. Notations *, **, and *** denote 
significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively. 
 
In the less or least developed countries, their lack of financial and technological 
resources to comply with the MRLs adopted in the high-income OECD countries 
presumably puts their agricultural exporters at disadvantages in the world market. From 
the viewpoint of international development, it is interesting to investigate if the trade 
costs due to MRLs are disproportionally borne by exporters from the less or least 
developed world. To test this hypothesis, we split the entire sample into two sub-samples: 
South-to-North trade and North-to-North trade. Specifically, we refer to the 20 high-
income OECD countries whose imports we focus on as North countries. In terms of per-
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capita income, the North countries are OECD members with per-capita income above 
20,000 in 2012 US dollars. The group of the remaining 40 countries is referred to as 
South. Using the two sub-samples, we estimate system (9a)-(9c) again and report the 
estimated coefficients in Table 4 and the marginal effects in Table 5.  
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Table 4. Estimated coefficients of high-income OECD’ import of plant products 
from the South and the North 
          South-to-North         North-to-North 
 Variable 
{parameter} 
Outcome 
Equation 
Selection 
Equation 
Outcome 
Equation 
Selection 
Equation 
Demand shifter 
{ } 
 0.745*** 
(0.068) 
 0.155*** 
(0.020) 
 0.928*** 
(0.084) 
 0.248*** 
(0.021) 
Trade-cost shifter 
{  } 
-0.421*** 
(0.077) 
-0.009 
(0.023) 
-0.259*** 
(0.093) 
-0.041 
(0.025) 
ln(Prod) 
{1  } 
 1.182*** 
(0.017) 
 0.238*** 
(0.001) 
 1.144*** 
(0.028) 
 0.211*** 
(0.003) 
ln(Tariff) 
{  } 
-0.345*** 
(0.131) 
-0.252*** 
(0.038) 
-2.477*** 
(0.195) 
-0.588*** 
(0.048) 
ln(Dist.) 
{ db } 
-2.411*** 
(0.059) 
-0.694*** 
(0.010) 
-1.890*** 
(0.091) 
-0.560*** 
(0.017) 
Border 
{ bb } 
-0.327** 
(0.140) 
-0.488*** 
(0.040) 
 2.019*** 
(0.183) 
 0.668*** 
(0.083) 
Colony 
{ cb } 
 1.367*** 
(0.070) 
 0.314*** 
(0.020) 
-0.310*** 
(0.117) 
-0.089*** 
(0.031) 
Language 
{ lb } 
 0.663*** 
(0.056) 
 0.229*** 
(0.015) 
 0.686*** 
(0.102) 
 0.212*** 
(0.026) 
Inverse Mills 
Ratio 
 3.371*** 
(0.104) 
 --   3.199*** 
(0.191) 
 -- 
# of Obs. 42,667 235,160  15,936 80,237 
Note: The year-specific importing countries’ fixed effects and the year-specific and chapter-
specific exporting countries’ fixed effects are included in the regressions but omitted from the 
table for brevity. Chapter-specific common religion variables are used as the excluded 
variables. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Notations *, **, and *** denote significance 
levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively. 
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Table 5. Marginal effects of MRLs on high-income OECD’ import of plant products 
from the South and the North 
 South-to-North  North-to-North 
 Intensive 
Margin 
Extensive 
Margin 
Intensive 
Margin 
Extensive 
Margin 
Demand-
enhancing 
Effect 
 0.745*** 
(0.068) 
 0.334 
(0.464) 
 0.928*** 
(0.084) 
 0.473 
(0.375) 
Trade-cost 
Effect 
-0.421*** 
(0.077) 
-0.020 
(0.057) 
-0.259*** 
(0.093) 
-0.078 
(0.078) 
H0: zero net effect of importer’s MRLs   
P value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: Marginal effects are computed as the averages of marginal effects for individual 
observations. Standard errors in parenthesis are derived from the Delta method. 
Notations *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively. 
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We first discuss the results in Table 4.  In either the North-to-North or South-to-
North trade, we find consistent evidence that the MRLs adopted by high-income OECD 
countries affect both sides of the market in plant product. Moreover, the MRL regulations 
influence trade primarily through the intensive margin. We leave the discussion of the 
magnitudes of the dual effects until the marginal effects are derived, as shown in Table 5.  
In terms of other sources of trade cost, we find that further tariff liberalization 
would benefit North-to-North trade more than South-to-North trade. One reason is that 
the less or least developed regions have been granted zero or low tariff rates, due to 
various regional and preferential trade agreements, so the potential gains from further 
tariff cut is diminishing. Geographic distance impedes South-to-North trade more than 
North-to-North trade, possibly due to their difference in logistics and other infrastructure. 
Historical colonial ties are more important for the partnership between South and North, 
rather than within North countries. The impacts of other trade determinants are similar as 
in the pooled regression. 
Next we focus on the marginal effects of MRLs in Table 5. All marginal effects 
bear the expected signs and support the hypothesis that the MRL regulations improve 
food safety as well as impose additional costs of trade. Furthermore, MRLs affect 
international trade mostly by altering the size of trade between existing trade partners. 
Trade partnership, however, is not hindered by MRL stringency. We also find that the 
demand-enhancing effect is stronger for shipments from North countries than those from 
South countries. This result suggests that consumers concerning food safety might have 
origin preferences. More importantly, we find that MRLs hinder the export flows from 
the South more than those from the North. This finding implies that the producers and 
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processors in the South countries have more difficulty complying with the MRL 
regulations imposed in high-income OECD countries. Overall, we find that the demand-
enhancing effect of MRLs outweighs its trade-cost effect for either imports from the 
North or the South. Therefore, MRLs as a policy tool to ensure food safety can achieve 
legitimate policy objectives without trade contraction.  
3.4.       Diagnostic analysis 
 One caveat in our econometric specification is the missing tariffs. In particular, 
we reduce the size of sample by nearly 15 percent by removing observations without 
tariff information in Macmap. To check the implications of the missing data problem, we 
keep the entire data sample but replace the tariff variable with a dummy variable 
indicating the engagement in one or more regional trade agreements between countries.26 
Consequently, we gain more degree of freedom at the expense of rougher measurement 
of border taxes. 
The supplementary results, shown in Appendix C, are qualitatively equivalent to 
the baseline results. In particular, we find that MRL stringency jointly enhance the import 
demand and hinder foreign exporters’ supply. However, it is less clear that exporters 
from the South are more adversely affected than their competitors from the North. In 
addition, regional trade agreements facilitate international trade in plant products, as 
expected. 
4. Conclusions 
The increasing predominance of SPS measures and TBTs and their implications on 
international trade and development are vexing issues for stake holders and policy 
                                                 
26 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm for a database for regional trade 
agreements available from the WTO. 
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makers. In particular, a large number of the WTO trade disputes citing the SPS and TBT 
agreements concern agriculture and food sectors, where market imperfections are 
prevalent. The corrective role of SPS measures and TBTs calls for a different analytical 
framework that captures both the impacts on consumers and producers. In this article, we 
propose a generalized gravity equation model identifying the separate impacts of MRLs, 
an important form of SPS measures, on both sides of the market for food imports. 
An application of our proposed model to high-income OECD countries’ imports 
of plant products delivers two robust results. First, MRLs enhances the import demand by 
ensuring higher food safety, as well as reduces export supply by imposing additional 
costs. Second, the compliance costs associated with MRLs put exporters from the less 
and least developed countries at a disadvantage in the world market for plant products. 
However, MRL stringency does not hinder the creation of new trade partnership. These 
findings contribute to the debate of SPS measures and TBTs. Our case study shows that 
the regulatory policies can achieve legitimate goals without impeding international trade 
in their cumulative effects. In addition, our proposed model helps rationalizing the mixed 
findings in the literature and provides analytical foundation that could be extended to 
welfare analysis. 
Future research could investigate the welfare implications of MRLs, accounting 
for the external or social benefits, such as better human health in the long run. With a 
reasonable measurement the non-market values of MRLs, one can fully analyze the 
benefits and costs of MRLs and identify the MRLs that are socially optimal for the global 
market.
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Appendix A 
Table A. Names of plant products, based on the Harmonized System 
Chapter Description Product names (HS 4 or 6 digits) 
HS-06 live trees & other plants canna,  chufa, dasheen 
HS-07 edible vegetables artichoke, asparagus, bean*, broccoli, Brussels 
sprouts, bulb onion, cabbage, cassava(roots), celery, 
chickpea, chicory(tops),  chrysanthemum, cucumber, 
eggplant, endive, garden beet(roots), garlic, green 
onion, lentil, lettuce(head), lettuce(leaf), mushroom, 
non-bell pepper, olive, pea*, potato, spinach, squash, 
sweet potato, tomato, turnip 
HS-08 edible fruits & nuts,  
peel of citrus/melons 
almond, apple*, apricot , avocado, blueberry, 
beechnut, Brazil nut, cantaloupe,  cashew, cherry, 
chestnut, coconut, date, dry prune plum , fresh prune 
plum,  grape, grapefruit, guava,  hazelnut, kiwifruit, 
kumquat, loquat,  nectarine, orange, papaya, peach, 
pear, pineapple,  pistachios, plantain, raisin, 
strawberry*, tangelo, walnut, watermelon, 
youngberry* 
HS-09 coffee, tea, mate & spices ginger, pepper, summer savory 
HS-10 Cereals barley, corn, corn salad, lupin, millet*, oat, rice, 
sorghum, wheat 
HS-12 oil seeds/ misc. grains/  
med. plants/ straw 
cotton seed, hop(dried cones), mustard spinach, 
peanut, sesame seed, sugar beet (roots) 
Note: Products with * have multiple matches in the HS classifications. See Li and Beghin (2012b) for details. 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B. List of importing and exporting countries 
Importing countries  Exporting countries 
        
Australia New 
Zealand 
 Algeria Domini-
can Rep. 
Israel Pakistan Thailand 
        
Belgium Portugal  Argentina Ecuador Italy Panama Trinidad/ 
Tobago 
        
Canada Rep. of 
Korea 
 Australia Egypt Jamaica Peru Tunisia 
        
Denmark Spain  Bahamas El 
Salvador 
Japan Philippine Turkey 
        
Finland Sweden  Barbados Finland Jordan Poland United 
Arab 
Emirates 
        
France United 
Kingdoms 
 Belgium France Kenya Portugal United 
Kingdoms 
        
Germany United 
States 
 Brazil Germany Lebanon Rep. of 
Korea 
United 
States 
        
Greece   Canada Greece Malaysia Russia 
Federation 
Venezuela 
 
        
Ireland   Chile Guatemala Mexico Singapore Vietnam 
        
Israel   China Honduras Morocco South 
Africa 
 
        
Italy   Columbia Hong 
Kong 
Nether-
lands 
Spain  
        
Japan   Costa 
Rica 
Indonesia New 
Zealand 
Sri Lanka  
        
Nether-
lands 
  Denmark Ireland Nicaragua Sweden  
Note: Importing countries are selected OECD members with nominal per-capita GDP over 20,000 US dollars as 
of 2012. Source: International Monetary Fund.  
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Table C. Estimated coefficients of high-income OECD’ import of plant products 
from the South and the North, with tariff replaced by RTAs 
          South-to-North         North-to-North 
 Variable Outcome 
Equation 
Selection 
Equation 
Outcome 
Equation 
Selection 
Equation 
Demand shifter 
 
 0.601*** 
(0.065) 
 0.091*** 
(0.019) 
 0.932*** 
(0.075) 
 0.288*** 
(0.018) 
Trade-cost shifter 
 
-0.308*** 
(0.074) 
 0.046** 
(0.023) 
-0.462*** 
(0.082) 
-0.114*** 
(0.022) 
ln(Prod) 
 
 1.192*** 
(0.017) 
 0.236*** 
(0.001) 
 1.120*** 
(0.026) 
 0.213*** 
(0.003) 
RTA 
 
 0.549*** 
(0.056) 
 0.274*** 
(0.015) 
 0.540*** 
(0.092) 
-0.003 
(0.025) 
ln(Dist.) 
 
-2.221*** 
(0.054) 
-0.575*** 
(0.010) 
-1.689*** 
(0.082) 
-0.580*** 
(0.015) 
Border 
 
-0.019 
(0.140) 
-0.278*** 
(0.040) 
 1.735*** 
(0.177) 
 0.649*** 
(0.082) 
Colony 
 
 1.336*** 
(0.068) 
 0.297*** 
(0.019) 
-0.165 
(0.105) 
-0.090*** 
(0.028) 
Language 
 
 0.732*** 
(0.055) 
 0.260*** 
(0.014) 
 0.459*** 
(0.087) 
 0.188*** 
(0.023) 
Inverse Mills 
Ratio 
 3.449*** 
(0.101) 
 --   2.968*** 
(0.175) 
 -- 
# of Obs. 46,412 270,690  18,555 98,351 
Note: RTAs refers to Regional Trade Agreements. The year-specific importing countries’ 
fixed effects and the year-specific and chapter-specific exporting countries’ fixed effects are 
included in the regressions but omitted from the table for brevity. Chapter-specific common 
religion variables are used as the excluded variables. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Notations *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively. 
 
